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Abstract Do low fertility and population aging lead to economic decline if cou-
ples have fewer children, but invest more in each child? By addressing this question,
this article extends previous work in which the authors show that population aging
leads to an increased demand for wealth that can, under some conditions, lead to
increased capital per worker and higher per capita consumption. This article is based
on an overlapping generations (OLG) model which highlights the quantity–quality
tradeoff and the links between human capital investment and economic growth. It
incorporates new national level estimates of human capital investment produced by
the National Transfer Accounts project. Simulation analysis is employed to show
that, even in the absence of the capital dilution effect, low fertility leads to higher
per capita consumption through human capital accumulation, given plausible model
parameters.
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Re ´sume ´ Les basses fe ´condite ´s et le veillissement de la population conduisent-ils
au de ´clin e ´conomique si les couples ont moins d’enfants, mais investissent plus dans
chaque enfant? La pre ´sente e ´tude explore cette question, dans le prolongement d’un
travail ante ´rieur des auteurs, dans lequel ils avaient e ´tabli que le vieillissement des
populations suscite une demande accrue de richesse qui peut, sous certaines
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DOI 10.1007/s10680-009-9186-xconditions, entraı ˆner un accroissement du capital par travailleur et une consomma-
tion par habitant plus e ´leve ´e. La me ´thode employe ´e est base ´e sur une mode `le a `
ge ´ne ´rations imbrique ´es qui met en e ´vidence le compromis entre quantite ´ et qualite ´
et les liens entre investissement en capital humain et croissance e ´conomique.
L’analyse inte `gre de nouvelles estimations nationales de l’investissement en capital
humain produites par le National Transfer Accounts Project (projet des comptes de
transfert nationaux). Une simulation permet de montrer que, me ˆme en l’absence
d’effet de dilution du capital, une basse fe ´condite ´ conduit a ` une consommation par
habitant plus e ´leve ´ea ` travers une accumulation de capital humain, avec des pa-
rame `tres de mode ´lisation plausibles.
Mots-cle ´s Transition de ´mographique   Capital humain   Quantite ´-qualite ´  
Vieillissement de la population   Croissance e ´conomique   Fe ´condite ´
1 Introduction
Low fertility in Europe and East Asia is leading to important changes in age
structure and to slowing or negative population growth. The immediate impact of
low fertility is to reduce the number of children in the population and to increase the
share of the population concentrated in the working ages, raising the support ratio
and correspondingly raising per capita income. We refer to this phenomenon as the
ﬁrst demographic dividend; others use different language (Kelley and Schmidt
1995; Bloom and Canning 2001; Mason and Lee 2006; Kelley and Schmidt 2007).
Later, as smaller cohorts of children reach the working ages, the share of the
working age population declines, the share of the older adults increases, and the
population ages. The support ratio falls, reducing per capita income. These shifts of
the population age distribution have important macroeconomic consequences that
feature prominently in discussions of the economic outlook in Europe and
elsewhere. In Europe, however, the share and sometimes absolute number in the
working ages is in decline raising concerns that the economic gains in recent
decades will be lost. While some consequences of the changing support ratios can
be understood through straightforward accounting, others are subtler, including
effects on accumulation of physical and human capital.
A large literature spanning many decades explores other effects of these
demographic changes. The conventional view is that low fertility and slower
population growth will lead to increased capital intensity and higher per capita
income. These effects are mediated by changing savings rates and labor force
growth rates (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Tobin 1967; Mason 1987; Kelley and
Schmidt 1995; Higgins and Williamson 1997; Lee et al. 2001a, b; Kinugasa and
Mason 2007). In the standard Solow–Swan growth framework, low fertility leads to
higher per capita consumption because slower labor force growth leads to capital
deepening. This is the case if the saving rate is given (Solow 1956) or is golden-rule
(Deardorff 1976). Samuelson raised the possibility, however, that in a model with
age distribution and a retirement stage, over some relevant range, lower population
growth may reduce welfare because workers will have to support a larger number of
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123elderly (Samuelson 1975, 1976). One purpose of this article is to revisit
Samuelson’s conjecture. Elsewhere, we have argued that the response of life cycle
saving when fertility and mortality are low will lead to an increased capital–labor
ratio (a ‘‘second demographic dividend’’) which offsets the growing burden of old
age dependency, provided that old age is not too generously supported through
public or familial transfer programs (Mason and Lee 2006).
The effects of demographic change on human capital have received less
attention, although there have certainly been important contributions, mostly but
not entirely theoretical (Becker et al. 1990; Mankiw et al. 1992; Montgomery
et al. 2000; Jones 2002). In order to draw a simple parallel with the Solow–
Swan model, a constant rate of investment in human capital inevitably leads to
an increase in human capital per worker if labor force growth slows. A deeper
understanding of these processes, however, requires that two important issues be
addressed. The ﬁrst is how investment in human capital affects economic
growth. The second issue, which receives more emphasis in this article, is how
demographic change interacts with investment in human capital. The central
idea, however, is as follows. If small cohorts of workers have high levels of
human capital because parents and/or taxpayers have invested more in each
child, standards of living may rise despite the seemingly unfavorable age
structure.
The ﬁrst contribution of this article is to provide a simple model of fertility and
human capital that follows very closely from the work of Becker et al. The second
contribution is to review previous research on the linkages between fertility, human
capital, and economic growth so as to lay a foundation for the analysis that follows.
The objective is to distill an important and somewhat unsettled literature to provide
focus on the important issue emphasized here.
The third contribution is to offer new empirical evidence about the tradeoff
between human capital investment and fertility based on data from the National
Transfer Accounts (NTA) project (Lee et al. 2008; Mason et al. 2009). This article
will present new estimates of public and private spending on education and health
for children for a cross section of countries, considering only expenditures and not
time costs. It will answer the simple empirical question of whether lower fertility at
the national level is associated with higher human capital investment per child and
whether this holds for both public and private sector investment in human capital.
We do not draw any inference about a causal relationship between fertility and
human capital investment.
Based on these estimates and a simple model, we will then simulate the effects
of changing fertility and human capital over the demographic transition on per
capita GDP and lifetime consumption, on the assumption that the estimated cross
sectional relationship between fertility and human capital investments held
throughout the transition and will hold in the future. We show that based on
reasonable parameter estimates an increase in human capital associated with lower
fertility may offset the greater cost of supporting the elderly in the older
population. Because there is considerable uncertainty in the literature about the
effects of education on growth at the national level, however, we cannot come to a
deﬁnitive conclusion on this point.
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1232 A Model of Fertility, Human Capital Investment, and Economic Growth
The population consists of three age groups: children (Nt
0), workers/parents (Nt
1),
and retirees (Nt
2). The number of children in period t depends on the fertility rate
(Ft), or the net reproduction rate to be more accurate, and the number of workers/
parents in year t. The number of workers in year t is equal to the number of children
in the preceding period. Moreover, the number of retirees in year t depends on the
number of workers in the preceding period and the proportion surviving to old age
(st):
N0
t ¼ FtN1
t
N1
t ¼ N0
t 1
N2
t ¼ stN1
t 1
ð1Þ
The total population is designated Nt.
The annual wage earned by workers (Wt) depends on the worker’s human capital
(Ht):
Wt ¼ gðHtÞð 2Þ
Human capital is acquired during childhood and depends on human capital
investment by parents during the preceding period:
Ht ¼ hðFt   1ÞWt   1 ð3Þ
where hðFt   1Þis the fraction of the parents wage invested in human capital per
child.
There is no physical capital in the model. Hence, income is equal to the wage. A
further implication of this assumption is that the consumption of children, the
consumption of retirees, and human capital investment are all funded via transfers
from workers. Income is allocated between two uses: consumption and human
capital spending. Designating per capita consumption by Xt and Pt as the relative
price of consumer goods (and setting the price of human capital investment to 1),
the social budget constraint is
WtN1
t   PtXtNt þ Ht þ 1N0
t ð4Þ
Investment in human capital is not considered part of consumption. Consumption
includes all other spending on children and consumption by workers and retirees.
The budget constraint from the perspective of the average or representative
worker or decision maker in this model is:
Wt  PtXt=SRt þ Ht þ 1Ft ð5Þ
where SRt ¼ N1
t

Nt is the support ratio and Ft ¼ N0
t

N1
t is the number of
children per parent.
In the basic quantity–quality tradeoff model of fertility choice (Becker and Lewis
1973; Willis 1973), a couple has the utility function U(x,n,q) where x is parental
consumption, n is the number of children, and q is the quality of each of the
identical and symmetrically treated n children. In our model, X includes all
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123consumption: that by the children, excluding human capital spending, as well as the
consumption of all adults, not just parents, and quality consists only of human
capital spending. In our model, quality (q) is human capital investment (H).
In pedagogical presentations of the model (Becker 1991, Ch. 5; Razin et al. 2002,
Ch. 3), it is assumed for simplicity that the allocation decision can be viewed as a
two-step procedure. Parents decide how to divide their income between own
consumption and spending on children, and the analysis focuses on the allocation of
total child spending between numbers of children and spending on each child, that is
the quantity and quality of children. We employ the same approach here. Workers
allocate their income between consumption of all members of their family and
human capital spending. Having done so, they select the number of children and
human capital spending so as to maximize their utility.
Note that in this formulation the decision makers (workers/parents) are making
their allocation decision without explicit reference to the future. However, implicit
in the decision is a weighing of current standards of living versus future standards of
living. The greater is spending on human capital the lower will be current
consumption and the greater will be future consumption. The actual consumption
during retirement of current workers is beyond their control, however. It depends on
the decision of the next generation of workers (their children) about allocating
resources between consumption and human capital investment, and allocating
consumption across generations.
2.1 The Support Ratio and the First Dividend
Per capita income in this simple model is the product of the wage and the support
ratio. Letting the total wage bill be represented by Tt, and the support ratio by SRt:
Tt=Nt ¼ WtSRt ð6Þ
The support ratio is determined by fertility and old age survival. Using the demo-
graphic relationships in Eq. 1, per capita income is equal to:
Tt
Nt
¼
Wt
1 þ Ft þ st   1=Ft   1
ð7Þ
Holding the wage constant, a decline in fertility in the current period leads to a
contemporaneous increase in the support ratio and in per capita income. In the
following period, however, the number of elderly dependents increases and, thus, the
support ratio and per capita income decline. The magnitude of the decline depends on
the old age survival rate. The higher the survival rate the greater the decline in the
support ratio and per capita income. Given the fertility rate, an increase in the
survival rate leads to a decline in the support ratio and per capita income.
The population dynamics in this simple model are not realistic but they capture
some of the important features of much more detailed analyses of the effects of age
structure on per capita income analyzed in a number of recent studies (Bloom and
Williamson 1998; Bloom and Canning 2001; Kelley and Schmidt 2001; Lee et al.
2001a, b; Bloom, Canning et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2003; Mason and Lee 2006; Kelley
and Schmidt 2007; Mason and Lee 2007).
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1232.2 Wage and Income Dynamics
Per capita income depends on changes in wages in addition to age structure. The
existence of the quantity–quality tradeoff means that a decline in fertility will lead
to an increase in human capital in the same period and an increase in wages in the
subsequent period. Substituting for human capital in Eq. 2 from Eq. 3 yields
Wt ¼ g½hðFt   1ÞWt   1 ð 8Þ
Note that these equations introduce a lag of one generation between investment in
the human capital of a generation of children and its effect on their labor produc-
tivity when they enter the labor force. The growth rate of total wages is
Tt þ 1=Tt ¼ FtghF t ðÞ Wt ½  =Wt ð9Þ
A decline in fertility has two effects on growth in total wages. The average wage
increases while the number of workers declines relative to those values for the
preceding generation.
Considering a special case allows a more detailed analysis of the dynamics.
Suppose that g and h are both constant elasticity functions as follows:
hðFtÞ¼aF
b
t
gðHt þ 1Þ¼cHd
t þ 1
ð10Þ
where b\0 and d[0. The growth of wages is given by
Wt þ 1=Wt ¼ adc

F
bd
t Wd   1
t ð11Þ
Noting that bd \ 0; we have the plausible result that for a given level of parental
human capital and wages, lower fertility leads to higher wages in the next
generation. Closely related to this result, we see that lower fertility leads to higher
wage rate growth from generation to generation. We also see that the growth rate of
wages is inversely proportional to the initial level of wages, for a given level of
fertility.
The equilibrium level of wages, for a given level of fertility, is found by setting
the growth ratio to unity:
1
adc
 1
d   1
F
bd=ð1   dÞ
t ¼ ^ W ð12Þ
Since bd\0, it follows from Eq. 12 that higher fertility is associated with lower
wages in equilibrium, provided that d\1.
The growth rate of total wages and total income in this model is
Tt þ 1=Tt ¼ adcWd   1
t F
1 þ bd
t ð13Þ
Fertility decline leads to more rapid growth in total wages if 1 þ bd[0: Empirical
evidence on this point is discussed below. A higher wage leads to a lower rate of
growth of wages if d\1.
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1232.3 Consumption
Human capital spending increases wages but at a cost––resources must be diverted
from consumption to achieve higher productivity (and consumption) in future
periods. Thus, consumption is measured by subtracting human capital investment
from total wages. Letting Ct ¼ PtXt represent total consumption, the relationship
between fertility and total consumption is
Ct ¼ Tt   WtN0
t hðFtÞð 14Þ
The share of aggregate production that is consumed is given by
Ct=Tt ¼ 1   FthðFtÞð 15Þ
In our constant elasticity special case, this becomes
Ct=Tt ¼ 1   aF
1 þ b
t ð16Þ
The consumption rate is either increasing or decreasing in F depending on the
elasticity of human capital spending with respect to F. In the simplest case, an
elasticity of -1, human capital spending as a share of total income is constant at a
and, hence, the consumption ratio is constant at 1-a.
The growth rate of consumption is given by
Ct þ 1=Ct ¼ adcWd   1
t F
1 þ bd
t
1   aF
1 þ b
t þ 1
1   aF
1 þ b
t
ð17Þ
The right-hand-side ratio captures the period-to-period change in the consumption
ratio. If b ¼  1, the ratio is equal to 1 and the change in consumption is equal to the
change in total wages.
In order to complete the picture, we must also incorporate into the analysis that
consumption ‘‘needs’’ vary with age. Thus, to track consumption in the simulation
analysis presented below, we use consumption per equivalent adult:
ct ¼ Ct

ða0N0
t þ N1
t þ a2N2
t Þð 18Þ
3 Empirics
3.1 Quality Expenditures and Human Capital
In the literature on the quantity and quality of children (Becker and Lewis 1973;
Willis 1973), all expenditures on children are combined and treated as investments
in child quality. In a later literature, all parental expenditures on children are viewed
as raising future earning prospects for children which is the operational deﬁnition of
quality (Becker and Barro 1988). Our approach here differs from this tradition. We
suggest that some expenditures on children have mainly consumption value for
those children and yield vicarious consumption value for the parents, while others
augment the children’s human capital (H). Speciﬁcally, we treat public and private
expenditures on health care and on education as human capital investment, and treat
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123all other kinds of expenditures on children, such as food, clothing, entertainment,
and housing as consumption.
The extended theoretical treatment of investment in child quality (e.g., Willis
1973; Becker and Lewis 1973) views quality as produced by inputs of time and
market goods and services. It would certainly be desirable to include parental time
inputs in the production of human capital, but National Transfer Accounts, our data
source, do not include time use and so we are not able to do so. Furthermore, the
literature on investment in education emphasizes the opportunity costs of the
children who stay in school to receive further education, and often this is the only
cost of education that is considered when private returns to schooling are estimated.
These opportunity costs are certainly relevant, but for now, we have included only
direct costs in our measure.
Increased investment in human capital can take place at the extensive margin by
raising enrollment rates, which implies higher opportunity costs as in the traditional
analysis. However, it can also take place at the intensive margin through greater
expenditures per year of education, through variations in class size, complementary
equipment, hours of education per day, or teacher quality, and pay rate. In East Asia,
much of the private spending appears to be of this sort, as children are sent to cram
schools or tutors, after the public school education is completed for the day. Such
increased expenditures do not necessarily have an opportunity cost of the sort
measured in traditional studies, and the increase in years of schooling would
underestimate the increase in human capital investment. In Europe, on the other
hand, education through apprenticeship may entail low costs and little lost time in
the labor force.
3.2 Cross-National Estimates of Human Capital Spending in Relation
to Fertility
The National Transfer Accounts (NTA) project provides the requisite data on age
patterns of human capital investments per child and labor income for nineteen
economies, rich and poor: the US, Japan, Taiwan, S. Korea, Thailand, Indonesia,
India, Philippines, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, France, Sweden,
Finland, Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary. Data are for various dates between 1994
and 2004. See Lee et al (2008) and Mason et al (2009). More detailed information is
available at www.ntaccounts.org.
For each country, we have age-speciﬁc data on public and private spending per
child for education and health. We sum spending per child on education across ages
0 to 26, separately for public and private. We do similarly for health care, but this
time, limit the age range to 0–17. These are synthetic cohort estimates. We also
have data on labor income by age, and we have calculated average values for ages
30–49, ages chosen to avoid effects of educational enrollment and early retirement
on labor income. The data are averaged across all members of the population at each
age, whether in the labor force or not, and include both males and females. They
include fringe beneﬁts and self-employment income, and estimates for unpaid
family labor which is very important in poor countries. We express human capital
expenditures relative to the average labor income. In terms of the theoretical model
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123presented above, our human capital measure is essentially H/W, the average child’s
human capital claim on labor income. This is our basic estimate of human capital
investment. For fertility, we take the average total fertility rate (F) for the most
recent ﬁve-year interval preceding the H-NTA survey date, using United Nations
quinquennial data. The total fertility rate is also a synthetic cohort measure.
Mean, minimum, and maximum values of H/W, and its components are reported
for the 19 economies for which NTA estimates were available. On average, 3.7
times the value of one year of prime age (30–49) adult labor is invested in human
capital per child over the (synthetic) childhood. On average, over 80% of that
investment is in education whereas 20% is in health spending. Public spending is
much greater than private, especially for education (see Table 1).
Figure 1 plots the natural log of H/W expenditures (that is, public and private,
health and education, summed over the childhood ages indicated above) per child
relative to labor income on the vertical axis, against the log of the Total Fertility
Rate on the horizontal axis. The corresponding descriptive regression is
ln H=W ðÞ ¼ 1:92   1:05  ln F ðÞ ; R2 ¼ :624
:14 ðÞ 7:3 ðÞ
where the values in parentheses are t-statistics. An elasticity of -1.0 would imply
that a constant share of labor income is spent on human capital investments
regardless of how many children couples have, so that a country with a TFR (F) of 3
would spend one third as much per child relative to labor income as a country with a
TFR (F) of 1. The point estimate for the elasticity is -1.05, which is not
signiﬁcantly different than -1.0.
Further analysis not detailed here indicates that this association results primarily
from variations in public spending on education, and therefore it would not be
apparent in micro-level analyses within countries. Heavy spending on private
education is limited to Asia, where three countries spend more on private than on
public. In Europe, all six NTA countries spend at least 7.5 times as much on public
as on private, while none of the non-European NTA countries rely so heavily on the
Table 1 Human capital spending and components, recent years, countries for which National Transfer
Account estimates are available
Mean Minimum Maximum
Human capital 3.73 1.17 6.21
Health 0.54 0.17 0.94
Health, public 0.33 0.09 0.52
Health, private 0.21 0.01 0.50
Education 3.18 0.52 5.44
Education, public 2.32 0.16 4.99
Education, private 0.86 0.05 3.60
Note: All values are normalized on annual per capita labor income of persons in the age group 30–49.
Source: National Transfer Accounts, www.ntaccounts.org
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123public sector. There is also evidence of substitution between public and private
spending on education across NTA countries.
3.3 How the Empirical Pattern is Related to the Quantity–Quality Tradeoff
Model
Consider Fig. 1 in light of the standard quantity-quality tradeoff theory. If
preferences are homothetic, Fig. 1 represents a meta budget constraint for the
quantity-quality tradeoff, i.e., the quantity–quality choice point for any country will
fall somewhere on this line. Homothetic preferences imply that the share of income
devoted to human capital spending (HF/W) is constant.
1 If so, then lnðHF=WÞ¼
lnðcÞ where c is the share of income devoted to human capital spending.
Rearranging the terms, we have lnðH=WÞ¼lnðcÞ lnF: Given that the coefﬁcient
of ln F is not signiﬁcantly different than -1 this is essentially the relationship
plotted in Fig. 1.
An alternative but essentially equivalent approach is to consider whether the
share of income devoted to human capital spending changes with income. When we
do this, we ﬁnd (t-statistics in parentheses):
ln HF=W ðÞ ¼ 0:57 þ 0:14 ln W ðÞ R2 ¼ :15
0:75 ðÞ 1:75 ðÞ
The coefﬁcient of ln(W) is insigniﬁcantly different than 0. Thus, we interpret Fig. 1
as a budget constraint common to the 19 NTA countries.
The empirical exploration uses average labor income for those aged 30–49, rather
than per capita income. A couple’s life time labor income in a synthetic cohort sense
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Fig. 1 Per child human capital spending (public and private) versus the total fertility rate. Note: Human
capital spending is normalized by dividing by the average labor income of adults 30 to 49 years of age.
Source of data: See Appendix
1 This would be true, for example, with Cobb–Douglas utility as a function of parental consumption and
total investment in children’s human capital, N1
t Ht.
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123is approximately 80 times this average, reﬂecting 40 years each of labor income for
husband and wife. If labor income is two thirds of total income Y then Y is roughly
120 times average labor income. The constant in the regression, 1.92, estimates
ln(c). Therefore c is about 6.8, and the share of HK expenditures out of labor income
is roughly 8.5% or 1/12 (= 6.8/80) of life time labor income, or 5.7% of total
income.
The standard theory suggests that as income rises, fertility falls and investments
in human capital rise, due to the interaction of quantity and quality in the budget
constraint and the greater pure income elasticity of quality than of quantity.
However, within the framework of the theory, there are a number of other factors
that may inﬂuence the choice of fertility versus HK along the budget constraint.
These include cultural differences in valuation of numbers versus quality;
differences in the relative price of parental consumption, px and human capital,
pq; the changing availability of new parental consumption goods; differences in
child survival; differences in the rate of return to education or in older age survival
probabilities may inﬂuence choices. The model can be expanded to include a ﬁxed
price of number of children, pn, not shown in the equations above (see Becker
1991). Examples are ﬁnancial incentives or disincentives for child bearing such as
family allowances in Europe or the ﬁnes of the one child policy in China. The
availability of contraceptives can also be interpreted as inﬂuencing the price of
numbers of children.
For all these reasons and more, countries move along the meta tradeoff line that
represents the quantity–quality tradeoff. In general, we know that over the
demographic transition countries move from low F and high H to high F and low H.
Our purpose here is not to identify the exogenous changes that are responsible for
that transition. Our purpose is to show that the economic implications of low F can
not be considered usefully without simultaneously considering that high H
accompanies low F.
3.4 Returns to Human Capital
The literature on the returns to health investment is relatively under-developed as
compared with the returns to education. Analysis of historical evidence leads Fogel
to conclude that nutrition and health have played a very important role in
development (Fogel 1997). Many studies of contemporary developing countries
support this view (Barro 1989; Bloom and Canning 2001; World Health
Organization, C. o. M. a. H 2001; Kelley and Schmidt 2007). On the other hand,
Acemoglu and Johnson argue that the importance of health to development is
overstated (Acemoglu and Johnson 2007). In contrast with the literature on
education, the literature on health provides little guidance about the rates of return
to education. Note also that health is a much smaller component of human capital
investment than is education.
For these reasons, we rely on the large empirical literature that assesses the
individual and aggregate returns to investment in education. Most of the literature
estimates private rates of return to education based primarily on the opportunity cost
of the time of the student who invests in an incremental year of education, although
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123sometimes tuition costs are also included. Card (1999) provides an analytic
overview of this literature and reviews many instrumental variable (IV) studies,
ﬁnding that in general, the IV studies report even higher rates of return to education
than do the ordinary least squares studies, with a broad range centering about 8%
per year. Heckman et al (2008) estimates rates of return for the US based on
extended Mincer-type regressions allowing for various complications, and also
including tuition, but without IV to deal with the endogeneity of schooling. They
report rates of return in the range of 10–15% or higher for the contemporary US (for
a college degree, given that one already has a high school degree).
For our purposes, this literature has two main problems: it focuses exclusively on
the extensive margin of years of schooling (as opposed to increased investment at a
given age) and it focuses exclusively on private rates of return rather than including
social rates of return, which could be higher (due to externalities) or lower (due to
inclusion of direct costs).
Another literature assesses the effect of education on per capita income or
income growth rates at the aggregate level. These estimates should reﬂect both full
costs of education and spillover effects. One approach treats human capital in a way
similar to capital, as a factor of production for which output elasticities can be
estimated. Studies taking this approach sometimes report similar estimated
elasticities of output with respect to labor, human capital, and capital (e.g., Mankiw
et al. 1992). Another approach views human capital as raising the rate at which
technological changes can be adopted. Thus, human capital is said to raise the
growth rate of output rather than its level (Nelson and Phelps 1966).
The earning functions ﬁt on individual data are generally speciﬁed in semi-
logarithmic form, which suggests that the underlying function linking the wage w to
years of schooling has the form: w ¼ ewE where w, is the rate of return to years of
education E. This suggests that human capital in relation to schooling level also has
this form. Cross-national estimates of aggregate production functions including
human capital as an input, from this perspective, should have the form Y ¼
AKaðHLÞ
1 a ¼ AKaðewELÞ
1 a; where L is the labor force and HL is, therefore, the
total amount of human capital given (this approach is taken from Jones 2002, and
Hall and Jones 1999).
However, this is not the form that these cross-national regressions take. Instead,
variables like median years of schooling completed or proportions enrolled in
secondary education are used to measure human capital (Mankiw et al. 1992; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 2004, p. 524). The difference is important. Under the exponential
version, the human capital increment associated with the 15th year of schooling is
four or ﬁve times larger than that associated with the ﬁrst year of schooling, when
w = .1. (Note also that our measure of human capital is conceptually closer to that
in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) than to Mankiw et al (1992), because just as
the former, ours reﬂects all levels of education and not just secondary).
The following analysis shows that if we take into account the time costs of
schooling at the aggregate level, then the micro approach described above implies
aggregate level output elasticities that are in the neighborhood of one third. E is both
the years of education acquired, and the years spent acquiring it. Suppose that absent
education, there are T potential years of work, so that actual years worked is (T – E).
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123If N is the number of potential workers, then L = N(T - E)/T is labor supplied in a
stationary population. Assume that our HK expenditure measure is proportional to E,
with a scaling factor absorbed in A. Substituting into (0.4), taking the derivative with
respect to E, and simplifying, we ﬁnd
dY=Y
dE
¼ 1   a ðÞ w  
1
T   E

ð19Þ
Evaluating this at w ¼ :1; T = 55, E = 10, and a = 2/3, we ﬁnd that increasing the
average education of the working age population by one year, from 10 years to
11 years, would raise GDP by about .05 if w ¼ :1; .03 if w ¼ :07and .08 if w ¼ :14:
Mankiw et al (1992) found roughly equal coefﬁcients for capital, human capital,
and raw labor. Based on this speciﬁcation, we have
dY=Y
dE
¼
1
3E
ð20Þ
Evaluating again at E = 10, this gives .033, which is reasonably close to the .05 or
.03 we derived above, but rather different than the .08. This exercise suggests that
after translation, the micro estimates and the macro estimates yield reasonably
consistent results. Our baseline assumption will be that the elasticity of output with
respect to human capital is .33, which is consistent with a micro level elasticity
w ¼ :07; which is lower than Card’s estimate and only about half of Heckman’s. We
also report results for aggregate elasticities of .16 and .50, to reﬂect the great
uncertainty.
3.5 Summary of Estimates and Qualitative Implications
The empirical study of others and the analysis of NTA data described above yield
estimates of the key parameters of the model presented in section II. The values,
given in Table 2 below, are used in the simulation exercises reported in the next
section. They can also be used to reach certain qualitative conclusions based on the
analysis presented above. The important parameters are the elasticity of wages with
respect to education (0.33) and the elasticity of quality, i.e., human capital spending,
with respect to quantity (-1.1). Given these parameters,
Table 2 Parameter values and sources
Value Source
a 0.1 In data, spending was 3.8 years worth of prime adult labor income; total years of prime age
adult labor was 39.4. Investment rate of 3.8/39.4 = approximately 0.1.
b -1.1 Regression from NTA estimates. See text.
c 1 Arbitrary (doesn’t matter)
d 0.33 Mankiw, Romer, and Weil; consistent with micro–level empirical literature when translated
into macro context.
a0 0.5 Estimated NTA consumption proﬁle for developing countries.
a2 1.0 Estimated NTA consumption proﬁle for developing countries.
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123• Lower fertility is associated with higher wages in the next period.
• Lower fertility is associated with higher wages in equilibrium.
• The growth of total wages is essentially not associated with fertility.
• The consumption ratio is independent of fertility, and thus consumption will
grow at the same rate as total wages.
These are not intended as causal statements. They are descriptive statements
about the aggregate patterns we should observe given a tradeoff between fertility
and human capital investment, on the one hand, and the effect of human capital
investment on productivity on the other.
4 Simulation
The simulation holds the estimated elasticity of human capital investment per child
with respect to fertility ﬁxed and considers how exogenously driven interlinked
changes in {H,F} over the demographic transition inﬂuence key features of the
economy. Adult survival is also assumed to be exogenous. The parameters, their
values, and sources are provided in Table 2. Note that there is no technological
progress in this simulation. Changes in wage levels and consumption result entirely
from changes in H, F, and adult survival.
The baseline simulation analyzes the transition in F, the NRR, from a peak value
of 2.0, to replacement level, F = 1, after one period. Fertility continues to decline
for two periods reaching a minimum of 0.6. Thereafter, fertility gradually recovers
eventually reaching replacement level. The baseline simulation also incorporates a
rapid transition in adult mortality with the proportion surviving to old age rising
from 0.3 to 0.8 over the course of the demographic transition.
The model is initialized by assuming that a pre-transition steady state existed in
t =- 2. F increased from 1.2 in t =- 2 at a constant rate to reach 2 in t = 0,
reﬂecting declining infant and child mortality. Adult survival is held constant during
this period. The age structure at t = 0 reﬂects these early demographic changes. The
corresponding changes in human capital are reported below.
The key demographic variables are presented in Table 3.
The simulation covers seven periods (generations) or roughly two centuries
during which there are three distinct phases, as follows:
Boom: Temporarily high net fertility which leads to an increase in the share of the
population in the working ages as measured either by the percentage of the
population who are workers or the support ratio. The boom lasts for a single
generation of thirty years.
2
Decline: Declining fertility is leading to a decline in the share of the working age
population and the support ratio. In the simulation this lasts for two generations or
approximately 60 years.
2 With the use of more detailed age data, estimates of the ﬁrst dividend stage are typically between one
and two generations long. For East and Southeast Asia, a region with rapid fertility decline, Mason (2007)
estimates the ﬁrst dividend period lasts 46 years on average.
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123Recovery: The share of the working age population and the support ratio rise as a
consequence of rising fertility with a one generation lag. In the baseline simulation,
recovery lasts for two generations or approximately 60 years.
For the ﬁnal two periods of the simulation, net fertility is held constant at the
replacement rate.
Note that the timing of fertility decline and recovery are not based on any
particular historical experience. A number of countries have reached very low
fertility rates similar to those in the baseline simulation, but it is unknown when they
might recover. Japan has had a TFR of 1.5 or less for almost two decades at this
point.
Table 4 reports human capital variables for the baseline simulation. The share of
the wage or labor income invested in the human capital of each child is reported in
the ﬁrst column. Human capital spending per child is low in period 0 because there
are so many children relative to the number of workers. The investment in human
capital in children in period 0 is actually less than the human capital of the current
generation of workers who were members of a smaller cohort. The large cohort
enters the workforce in period 1 leading to the ﬁrst demographic dividend. Note that
the average wage has declined from period 0 to 1 because members of the large
cohort have less human capital than the previous generation of workers. During the
Table 3 Demographic variables, baseline simulation
Period NRR Survival
to old age
Growth
rate
Percent of population Support
ratio
Children Workers Elderly
0 2.0 0.3 0.019 62.7 31.4 8.8 0.457
1 1.0 0.6 0.012 43.5 43.5 5.9 0.556
2 0.6 0.8 0.001 25.0 41.7 13.0 0.476
3 0.8 0.8 -0.008 25.5 31.9 33.3 0.366
4 1.0 0.8 -0.009 33.3 33.3 42.6 0.400
5 1.0 0.8 -0.002 35.7 35.7 33.3 0.435
6 1.0 0.8 0.000 35.7 35.7 28.6 0.435
Table 4 Human capital variables
Period Human capital
spending per
child/Wage
Wage Human capital
spending per
child
Average human
capital of workers
Human capital
spending/GDP
0 Boom 0.047 0.263 0.012 0.017 0.093
1 Decline 0.100 0.234 0.023 0.012 0.100
2 0.175 0.290 0.051 0.023 0.105
3 Recovery 0.128 0.374 0.048 0.051 0.102
4 0.100 0.367 0.037 0.048 0.100
5 0.100 0.336 0.034 0.037 0.100
6 0.100 0.326 0.033 0.034 0.100
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123ﬁrst dividend period, then, the favorable impact of the entry of a large cohort of
workers is moderated because the large cohort is disadvantaged with respect to its
human capital.
The impact of low fertility on human capital occurs during the fertility decline
phase. Human capital spending per child increases from 4.7 percent of the average
adult’s wage in period 0 to 10.0 percent in period 1, and to 17.5 percent in period 2.
With a one generation lag this leads to greater human capital and a higher wage. The
peak in human capital investment per child is reached in period 2 and the peak in
human capital is reached in period 3.
Note that the trend in human capital investment depends both on the share of the
wage invested in human capital per child and also on the wage. Thus, human capital
has a multiple effect. The wage or the human capital of the current generation of
workers depends on the human capital investment they received and also the human
capital investment received by their parents’ generation.
During the recovery period fertility is rising and, hence, human capital
investment is declining. With a lag the human capital of the workforce declines
as does the average wage until an equilibrium is reached at replacement fertility.
Key macroeconomic results are reported in Fig. 2. The support ratio is of interest
because it marks the three demographic phases (boom, bust, and recovery) and also
because it tells us how consumption and income would vary in the absence of
investment, human capital or otherwise. If all labor income is consumed and none
invested, consumption per equivalent adult exactly tracks the support ratio.
Following the boom period, labor income would increase by about 20 percent.
Thereafter, fertility decline would have a severe effect leading to a decline in
consumption by one third. As fertility recovers and the working population rises
relative to the older population, consumption would recover but only to about ﬁve
percent below the pre-transition level. Thus, the ﬁrst dividend would not only be
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123entirely transitory but very low fertility would have a strongly adverse effect on
standards of living with a one generation lag.
With human capital investment, the outcome is very different. GNP per capita
grows about as rapidly as the support ratio during the ﬁrst dividend period.
However, consumption per equivalent adult consumer grows much more slowly
because much of the gain in per capita output is invested in human capital. The
returns on this investment are realized in the next two periods when consumption
rises at the same time that the support ratio falls due to population aging. At the
peak, GNP per capita is 50 percent above the pre-transition level. Per capita GNP
declines as fertility increases and spending on human capital declines, but per capita
GNP stabilizes at a level about 40% above the pre-transition level.
Consumption per equivalent adult rises much more slowly than per capita GNP
or the support ratio during the boom period. The reason for this is two-fold. First,
the share of GNP devoted to human capital increases moderately so less is available
for consumption. Second, the decline in the relative number of children has a larger
impact on per capita GNP (children count as 1) than on C per equivalent adult
(children count as 0.5). Thereafter, consumption per equivalent adult rises markedly
achieving a 20 percent increase as compared with period 0. Consumption stabilizes
at a higher level––between 15 and 20% above the pre-dividend level.
The key feature of this simulation is that human capital investment has allowed
the ﬁrst dividend to be converted into a second dividend. The affects of population
aging are reversed as large cohorts of less productive members are replaced with
small cohorts of more productive members.
5 Variations in Parameters and Demographics
How sensitive are the results to variations in parameter values and demographic
variables? We have carried out a variety of sensitivity tests for variations in the
values of the key elasticities. If the elasticity of investment with respect to fertility is
set at -1.5 rather than the -1 of baseline, then the consumption gains from low
fertility are greatly increased. If the elasticity is set at -.7 then the gains are much
reduced and consumption more nearly tracks the support ratio. When the elasticity
of the wage with respect to human capital is set at .5 versus the baseline value of
.33, the beneﬁts of fertility decline are much larger, but when it is set at .16 the
beneﬁts of low fertility vanish in the long term, and population aging overwhelms
the higher labor productivity. When the two high (in absolute value) elasticities are
used at the same time, the effects on consumption are three or four times as great as
baseline. When the two low values are used, however, consumption tracks the
support ratio quite closely and the gains from low fertility are small. Clearly the
results depend on the parameter values.
A ﬁnal set of simulations explores how features of the fertility transition
inﬂuence the path of consumption given the baseline parameters values (Fig. 3).
Three scenarios are considered. In the ﬁrst, the fertility rate declines slowly, over
two generations rather than one, to replacement level and declines no further. In the
second scenario, fertility declines rapidly, over one generation, to replacement
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123fertility and declines no further. In the third scenario, fertility declines slowly to
sub-replacement level, 0.6 as in the baseline scenario, and recovers at a speed
similar to that in the baseline. Note that in all the cases, the demography at the end
of the simulation is identical. Hence, steady state consumption per equivalent adult
will be the same at the end of the simulations. Our interest here is in the paths to that
steady state. In the simulation results presented here, steady state has not yet been
entirely realized. By period 9 (not charted) steady state has been reached with
consumption per equivalent adult 16 percent higher than in period 0.
Perhaps the most striking difference in the simulations is that the slow fertility
transition to replacement fertility, given the baseline parameter values, results in a
consumption path that declines when the ﬁrst large birth cohort enters the workforce
and only begins to increase when the second large birth cohort enters the workforce
in period 2. In this scenario, the rise in the old age population never is sufﬁcient to
depress consumption per equivalent adult. In the other three scenarios, consumption
declines in one period because of the increase in the share of the population at older
ages.
6 Conclusions
A number of potentially important issues related to changes in population age
structure are explored in this article, albeit in a highly stylized way. The key idea is
that it is insufﬁcient to focus on the relative number of people in age groups. The
productivity of those individuals also matters. Because investment in human capital
and fertility are closely connected, the total amount produced by a cohort will not
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123decline in proportion to its numbers. Indeed, it is possible that it could rise as cohort
size falls.
In the context of the demographic transition, the potential tradeoff between
productivity and numbers raises interesting questions. First, does the ﬁrst dividend
have a diminished effect on per capita income because the large entering cohorts of
workers will have lower human capital per capita than preceding cohorts? Second,
is investment in human capital a mechanism by which the ﬁrst dividend can be
invested in future generations––generating a lasting second dividend? The third
question concerns Samuelson’s conjecture. Does lower fertility and slower
population growth always lead to higher standards of living, or can fertility be
too low in the sense that rising old age dependency ratios more than offset the
human capital gains?
The implication of rising fertility for human capital investment and economic
growth is relevant at two points over the demographic transition as modeled in this
article. Before childbearing begins to decline, the net reproduction rate increases
due to reduced infant and child mortality. Also during the recovery period the rise in
fertility leads to a decline in human capital investment. In both cases, rising fertility
leads to an increase in the share of the working population and a demographic
dividend, but one that will be more modest if the larger generation of workers is less
productive than the preceding one. This is an interesting possibility but the
evidentiary base is weak. The data used to estimate the tradeoff between fertility and
human capital investment come from countries that differ in the extent to which
their fertility rates have declined, but no country is represented prior to the onset of
fertility decline or at early stages of the decline. The existence and magnitude of the
quantity–quality tradeoff may be very different during other phases of the
demographic transition and dividend, but no data are available to assess this.
Our empirical results suggest that human capital expenditures per child are
substantially higher where fertility is lower, to the extent that the product of the total
fertility rate and human capital spending per child is roughly a constant share of
labor income across countries, although total spending per child falls with fertility.
About one-twelfth of parental life time labor income is spent on human capital
investments, in countries such as Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, and Japan with TFRs
near one, and in poorer countries such as Uruguay with a TFR of 2.5 or the
Philippines with a TFR of 3.6 (at the time of observation in Fig. 1). This suggests
that during the demographic transition, a portion of the ﬁrst demographic dividend
is invested in human capital, reinforcing the economic beneﬁts of fertility decline. It
also suggests that the very low fertility in some countries such as Austria, Slovenia,
Hungary, Japan, Taiwan, or S. Korea is associated with an increased human capital
investment per child that might reduce or at least postpone the support problems
brought on by population aging.
Second, human capital investment is a potentially important mechanism by
which a second demographic dividend can be generated. Fertility decline leads to
substantial population aging and a rising dependency burden. As measured by the
support ratio, the dependency burden can be as great or greater at the end of the
transition as at the beginning. Although we have not emphasized this feature of
the simulation model, the transfers from workers to the elderly are very substantial
Fertility, Human Capital, and Economic Growth over the Demographic Transition 177
123at the end of the transition. Standards of living as measured by consumption per
equivalent adult can be sustained at relatively high levels, however, if the quantity–
quality tradeoff is sufﬁciently strong and if human capital has a sufﬁciently strong
effect on productivity. If the rate of growth is raised sufﬁciently by human capital
investments, then even the share of output transferred to the elderly need not rise
much.
The third issue is whether slower population growth is always better. This
question can be answered using simulation results not reported in the main body of
the article. We allowed the elasticity of human capital with respect to fertility to
vary as in the sensitivity analysis reported above. Steady-state consumption per
equivalent adult was calculated using NRRs of 1.2, 1, 0.8, and 0.6. If the elasticity
of output with respect to human capital is set to the baseline value of 0.33, slower
population growth leads to higher consumption per equivalent adult for any of the
elasticities used to measure the quantity–quality tradeoff. If the elasticity of output
with respect to human capital is set to 0.16 (well below the level implied by rate of
return estimates as discussed earlier), and if the elasticity of human capital with
respect to fertility is set to -0.7 rather than -1.0, then, consumption per equivalent
adult is higher for an F of 1 than for an F of 0.8 or 1.2.
There are many important qualiﬁcations that should be kept in mind in
considering these results. First, the model of the economy is highly stylized in
several important respects. We do not allow for capital, although this is an issue that
we have explored extensively elsewhere. There is no technological innovation,
although we believe this can be introduced with little effect on the conclusions.
With the use of only three age groups, we are relying on a very unrealistic
characterization of the population and the economy. A model with much greater
detail would be better suited to providing a quantitative assessment of the issues
being explored here, and we believe we can construct one from the building blocks
introduced here.
Second, the role of human capital in economic growth is unsettled in the
literature. Estimates of the importance of human capital vary widely. It is very likely
that the effect of human capital varies across countries depending on a host of
factors that are not explored here. At this point, we can do no better than allow for a
wide range of possible effects.
Third, the empirical basis for quantifying the quantity–quality tradeoff is also
weak, although it is widely accepted that such a tradeoff exists. An interesting result
here is that the tradeoff is a feature of public spending rather than private spending.
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the results presented here because we
are not asserting any particular causal relationship between fertility and human
capital. Thus, it would be quite inappropriate to argue for fertility policy of any sort
based on the simple cross sectional relationship between human capital spending
and fertility. We are only saying that countries with lower fertility are spending
more on human capital per child. This being the case, low fertility and population
aging may not have the adverse affects on standards of living that are widely
anticipated. This conclusion holds even though the elderly rely entirely on transfers
from workers for their material support.
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123Population aging entails growing transfers from workers to the elderly in
industrial nations today, through rising payroll tax rates and family support burdens.
These transfers are becoming increasingly painful. We must recognize, however,
that population aging is intrinsic to the processes that bring us an highly educated
population and comfortable standards of living.
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